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E-mail meetings hurt open government in Virginia
by Forrest "Frosty" Landon
Reprinted from the Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star, Oct. 19,
2003.
There's an old saying that suggests if you're not
confused by a complicated issue, you're clearly
misinformed.
The Fredericksburg City Council e-mail case, now headed to the
Virginia Supreme Court, has a lot of folks confused—and a lot
more misinformed.
Strip away confusion and misinformation, and what's really
at stake is the commonwealth's decades-old statute that
broadly mandates open meetings of governmental bodies and bans
outright any electronic meeting, in any form and at any time, by
any city, county or town.
In Virginia, we don't recall governors or load a ballot
with pure-democracy initiatives; our form of Madison-type
representative government generally empowers public officials to
act on our behalf—and we wait for the next election to
applaud good public servants and throw out the bums.
In the e-mail case, that's threatened.
"Affairs of government are not intended to be conducted in
an atmosphere of secrecy," the Virginia Freedom of
Information Act reminds us. Exceptions to this FOIA mandate are to
be narrowly construed; public-meeting guarantees must be broadly
interpreted.
That's so policy deliberation and
decision-making—not just pro forma public votes—occur
in the sunshine. Otherwise, James Madison's theories come
unraveled. We can hardly cast informed votes if we can't
observe governmental deliberations as they take place.
Our coalition's board of directors believes "use of
e-mails to discuss public business among three or more public
officials (or between two, if a quorum) must be subject to rules
for public meetings."
That issue is at the heart of Beck v. Shelton.
As Fredericksburg Circuit Judge John Scott found, when three or
more members of the Fredericksburg City Council exchanged e-mails,
public business got discussed—and that constituted an
impermissible meeting.
(Where we think Judge Scott erred was in holding that one
e-meeting was illegal because "consensus" was
reached—and another, lacking such consensus, was legal. FOIA
makes no such distinction, nor should it.)
Gutting the open-meetings law is certainly not Mayor
Beck's intent; nor is it the intent of his allies, the
Virginia Municipal League and the Virginia Association of Counties.
All are members of our coalition; all share our open-government
principles. But we're dealing here with an area of untested
law; neither Beck nor his associates, in my judgment, was acting in
bad faith. Nor should the General Assembly be faulted for failing
to define fully an e-meeting-by computer; the law seldom keeps up
with technology, in Richmond or elsewhere.
Fatal connection'
But the FOI statute explicitly covers "informal
assemblages." My dictionary offers lots of common-sense
definitions of "assemblages" and
"assemble." One speaks of "connecting,"
another of "coming together." Narrowly (or broadly)
interpreted, that covers a "meeting" by
computer—a meeting that's clearly illegal if three or
more local officials exchange public-business messages.
As we've said in a friend-of-the-court brief, because
e-mails can so rapidly be sent, received, responded to, and further
discussed, an electronic meeting occurs before participating
members of a local public body even realize it.
Nobody doubts the legality of a one-on-one e-mail exchange (when
not involving a quorum), or the legality of an e-mail sent by one
elected official to all or several other members of a public body.
Members of a public body may separately contact other members to
ascertain their positions on any public issue. Recipients can
respond to the sender, or they can have a one-on-one exchange with
another recipient.
What they must not do is click "reply all" or in any
way respond so the whole group is privy to the exchange. At that
point the communication is not like letters, a fax, or voicemail;
it must be treated as an illegal meeting. If elected officials can
figure out any e-mail system, they can find the "reply to
sender" button. That's not an onerous expectation; it
won't discourage good people from seeking public office, and
it won't paralyze local government in Fredericksburg,
Fairfax, or Fries.
Premising the existence of an illegal meeting on whether
messages were exchanged "simultaneously," as some also
urge, simply does not give local officials a workable
solution—or citizens an open-government guarantee.
Public bodies would be left to define simultaneity. "Chat
room" and "instant messaging" discussions
obviously would be covered, but what about two "IM"
members exchanging views—and a third providing a deliberately
delayed response?
(An unscrupulous official could sit poised by his computer,
waiting for the requisite amount of time to elapse before
continuing the exchange—or manipulating a computer's
internal clock to post-date the actual time his e-mail was
sent.)
A 1999 opinion by the state attorney general holds that a single
member of a governing body could send e-mail to several other
members. Nobody quarrels with that ruling, for it involves only
one-way, "garden variety" e-mail sent to at least two
other elected officials. But it should not be stretched to cover
back-and-forth exchanges among three or more officials. Those who
misstate the opinion do a disservice to the AG.
Voice of authority
Much more on point is the 2001 opinion from the Freedom of
Information Advisory Council—an agency created by the
legislature in 2000 to foster FOIA compliance and provide
authoritative, impartial interpretations of open-government law.
Its opinions are "presumed to be correct and entitled to
great weight unless plainly wrong," a senior assistant
attorney general has properly stated.
The advisory council opined that when "e-mail and all
subsequent responses are automatically viewed by all members of the
public body the nature of the electronic transmission crosses the
line between correspondence and discussion."
To date, that's the only Virginia opinion that's
grasped some of the knotty e-mail issues raised in Beck v.
Shelton.
Whatever the various debates about e-mail meetings, one thing
remains inarguable: officials' e-mails are clearly subject to
Virginia's public-records law. When electronic messages deal
wholly with public business, they thus can be inspected and copied
by any Virginia citizen (whatever the motive—political
mischief or otherwise). Likewise, if contents are partially exempt
from disclosure, a record custodian must always excise the
confidential portions—and disclose everything else.
Some suggest that e-mails are a great boost to public access,
establishing a "paper" (i.e., digital) trail that never
existed when such officials used the phone or the street corner to
govern in the shadows. Indeed, when e-mails are archived at a
single access point, as now occurs in Fredericksburg, access to
documents may well be enhanced.
But this argument ("e-mail meetings don't
matter!") fails to address a potentially far greater
downside: If exchanges of electronic mail are not subject to
e-meeting rules, public meetings will become less frequent and more
meaningless—a post-discussion record may be attainable, but
only if citizens have the time or know-how to obtain it. And if
obtained, it may come too late for anybody to have input before a
pro forma public vote.
(Even if record access is timely, e-mails won't capture
what only the human eye will observe at a face-to-face
meeting.)
To keep local government fully transparent in the Internet age,
the Virginia Supreme Court should uphold the heart of Judge
Scott's opinion. For, as the Fredericksburg Circuit Court
wisely sensed, improper electronic meetings can easily occur when
"assemblages" of elected public officials gather at the
computers, simultaneously or not.
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